LEGAL ARTICLES

What is FIR?
The expression ‘FIR’ is the abbreviated form of First Information Report. “First Information” or “First Information Report” is not defined in Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, but these words are always understood to mean an information recorded U/s-154 (1) of Cr.P.C.
It is the information given to a police officer in the form of a complaint or accusation regarding the commission of or suspected commission of a cognizable offence. FIR is the information which is given to the police first in point of time on the basis of which the police may select ad record as First Information [AIR 1975 SC 1453].
FIR is the first step of Criminal Procedure that leads to the trial and punishment of a criminal. It is also the most important supportive evidence on which the entire structure of the prosecution of the case is built up.
The object of FIR is to set the criminal law in motion. It enables the police Officer-in-Charge of the police station to initiate the investigation on the crime and to collect evidence as soon as possible. This report forms the foundation of the case.
Object of FIR :-
The objects of FIR can be summarized as follows –
a) To set the criminal law in motion.
b) To inform the magistrate of the district and the District Superintendent of the Police who are responsible for peace and safety of the district about the offence reported at the station.
c) To inform the judicial officers before whom the case is ultimately tried about the facts given out immediately after the occurrence and the materials on the basis of which the investigation was initiated.
d) To safeguard the accused against subsequent variations or additions.
e) To obtain information about the alleged criminal activity in order to take suitable action for tracing and bringing the guilty party.
Sec.154(1) of Cr.P.C.:-
(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer-in-Charge of a police station-----
i) shall be reduced to writing by him or
ii) shall be reduced to writing under his direction
and
iii) shall be read over to the informant
(2) Every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it and
(3) the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Govt. may prescribe in this behalf.
Conditions required for recording FIR u/s-154 Cr.P.C. :-
The following conditions should be satisfied to constitute an information as First Information Report within the meaning of Sec.154 (1) of Cr.P.C.:-
1) It must be the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence.
2) It must be given to an Officer-in-Charge of a police station.
3) It must be put into writing. If it is already written, it has to be signed by the person giving it.
4) If it is orally made, it must be taken down in writing and read over to the informant.
5) The substance of the information shall be entered in the prescribed register (General Diary or Station Diary).

This article emphatically contains the significance of FIR from the view point of Indian Evidence Act.
Evidentiary value of FIR
# FIR---a public document:-
FIR is a public document prepared u/s-154 of Cr.P.C. A certified copy of an FIR can be given in evidence. A copy of the FIR can be given to the accused only under the order of the court after the court has taken cognizance of the case and not before. But the accused can get a copy of the FIR on payment of adequate fees from the court. The Officer-in-Charge of the police station is not authorized to give the copy of FIR to the accused. If he does so, he will be liable U/s-29 of the Police Act, 1961.
# Statements made in FIR are not privileged:-
The statements made in the FIR are not privileged. They do not enjoy immunity. If the statements made in the FIR is found to be defamatory in nature, the maker of the FIR is liable to be prosecuted. The privilege can be claimed if the informant can bring such statement under the purview of the Exception-8 of Sec.499 of I.P.C. to show that he made the statement in good faith.
# Use of FIR for corroboration or contradiction:-
FIR is not a substantive evidence. It can be used to corroborate the informant U/s-157 of Indian Evidence Act or to contradict him U/s- 145 of Indian Evidence Act, if the informant is called as a witness at the time of trial.
Sec.157 of I.E.Act:- Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact:-
In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.
Sec.145 of I.E. Act:- Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing:-
A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.

FIR can’t be used for corroborating or contradicting any witness other than the person who has lodged the FIR ----------- [Hasib v. State of Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773; Damodar Prasad v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 622]

FIR can be used by the defence to impeach the credit of the person who lodged the FIR U/s-155(3) of I.E.Act.
--------[Shanker v. State of U.P. AIR 1975 SC 757]
Sec.155 of I.E.Act:- Impeaching credit of witness:-
The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party or with the consent of the court by the party who calls him:-
1) By the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe him to be unworthy of credit;
2) By proof that the witness has been bribed or has baacpeted the offer of a bribe or has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;
3) By proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;

Explanation--- A witness declaring another witness to be unworthy of credit may not, upon his examination-in-chief, give reasons for his belief, but he may be asked his reasons in cross-examination, and the answers which he gives can’t be contradicted, though, if they are false, he may be afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.

FIR can be used to contradict only the maker of informant who lodged the FIR under sections-145 and 155 of I.E.Act, but not the other witnesses -------- [Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. 1957 CrLJ 550 SC; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar 1956 CrLJ Pg 100 SC]
# Value of FIR lodged by the accused:-
If the FIR is given to the police by the accused himself, it can’t be used wither for corroboration or contradiction because the accused can’t be used as a prosecution witness and he would very rarely offer himself to be a defence witness U/s-315 of Cr.P.C.
If the FIR is of a confessional nature, it can’t be proved against the accused-informant, because according to Sec.25 of I.E.Act, no confession made to a police officer can be proved as against the accused person.
But the FIR made by the accused becomes relevant under the following cases:-

(1) The FIR lodged by the accused may be relevant U/s-8 of I.E.Act as his conduct.
Sec.8:- Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct:-
Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.
The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the
conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.

Explanation 1.—The word “conduct” in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.

Explanation 2.—When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.

(2) If the FIR lodged by the accused is non-confessional, it may be admissible in evidence against the accused as an admission U/s-21 of I.E.Act regarding certain facts.
------[Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. 1957 550 SC]

Sec.21:-Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf.-
Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the following cases:-
(1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons under section 32.
(2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.
(3) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.

(3) If the FIR is confessional in nature, certain portion of such FIR lodged by the accused can be used against him if it leads to the discovery of a fact within the meaning of Sec.27 of I.E.Act.
----------[Agnou Naagesia v. State of Bihar 1966 CrLJ 100 SC]
Sec.27:- How much of information received from accused may be proved.-
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
# FIR and Dying Declaration:-
In case of death of the informant, FIR can be used as substantive evidence if it relates to the cause of death of the informant or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in the informant’s death within the meaning of Sec.32 (1) of I.E.Act.
-----[Damodar Prasad v. State of U.P. AIR 1975 SC 757]

Sec.32(1) :- Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.-
When it relates to cause of death.-
(1) When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in
which the cause of that person's death comes into question,
Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

In no other case FIR can be used as a substantive evidence. FIR lodged by the deceased is admissible U/s-32(1) as the statement of a person since deceased relating to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.
---------Kapoor Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1930 Lahore 450)

A FIR can be treated as a dying declaration if the informant dies of his injuries after lodging the report to the police -------- Munna Raja v. State of M.P. (AIR 1976 SC 2199)

In the case of Munna Raja v. State of M.P. (AIR 1976 SC 2199) Munna Raja and Chottan were tried by the Sessions Judge, Chattarpur on the charge that at about 10 a.m. on April 30th 1969 they committed murder of one Bahadur Singh. Two eye witnesses were turned hostile and learned Sessions Judge thought that it was unsafe to rely on their testimony. In this case there were three dying declarations made by the deceased Bahadur Singh and the prosecution placed great reliance on them. The Sessions Court was also impressed by three dying declarations given by the deceased Bahadur Singh, but finally the accused persons were acquitted by the Sessions Court.

The Supreme Court held that the judgment of the Sessions Court suffers from a patent infirmity because it wholly overlooks the earliest dying declaration which was made by the deceased soon after the incident. The Second dying declaration is the FIR lodged by the deceased at the police station. Probably the Sessions Court assumed that since the statement was recorded as an FIR, it could not be treated as a dying declaration. On the basis of such assumption the Sessions Court committed an error.

The Supreme Court also observed that after making the statement before the police the deceased Bahadur Singh succumbed to his injuries and therefore the statement can be treated as a dying declaration and is admissible U/s-32(1) of Indian Evidence Act.

It was also held that the statement was made by Bahadur Singh at the police station by way of FIR. After recording the information the investigation was commenced and therefore it is wrong to say that the statement was made to an investigation officer. The Station House Officer who recorded the statement did not possess the capacity of an investigation officer at the time of recording the statement.

If the complainant who had been belaboured died a natural death and not because of the injuries caused to him, Sec.32(1) is not applicable. [Umrao v. State of M.P. AIR 1961 MP 45]

When an FIR is lodged by the deceased clearly implicating the accused and containing the details of the incident, the same could be used as a dying declaration. [Pancham Yadawa v. State of U.P. 1994 CrLJ 848 (All)]

If the informant disappears after filling an FIR and there is no proof of his death, it is not admissible.
The injured died during the trial. The FIR lodged by him was treated as a dying declaration but the prosecution made no effort to establish the cause of his death or the connection between the death and injuries in question. The time of his death was unknown. The statement in FIR was held to be not admissible as dying declaration. [Sukhar v. State of U.P. (1999) 9 SCC 507]

A dying declaration was recorded by a sub-inspector in the nature of an FIR but it was not attested by the doctor to the effect whether the injured was conscious or not. The signature or thumb impression of the deceased was also not taken. The dying declaration in the FIR was held to be highly doubtful. [Maniram v. State of M.P. AIR 1994 SC 840]
# Death of the Informant and Value of FIR:-
There is no law which provides that the FIR can’t be taken into consideration on the death of the informant. FIR can’t be thrown out on the death of the informant. The case needs to be proved on the basis of evidence collected by the prosecution during the course of investigation. FIR is not an evidence in a case, it is only a piece of informant with the police records with which the system comes into motion.

FIR is only used for corroboration or contradiction if the complainant is examined. In a case where the first informant died before he could depose in the court, the purpose of corroborating or contradicting its contents by the person, would not be possible. In view of this, the accused could not cross examine the first informant and the other pieces of evidence which are produced in the court can be looked into. As the FIR is not a substantial piece of evidence, it should not have any effect on the prosecution case it its contents are not proved by the person who gave it due to his death. [E.J.Goud & others v. State of A.P. 2004 (2) ALD (CRL)241 (AP)]

In the case of Hakirat Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1997 SC 323], the Supreme Court held that non-examination of the complainant on account of his death could not be factual on its own to the prosecution case and it will depend on the facts of each case. If the prosecution story as revealed by the witnesses in the court is directly contradictory to the contents of FIR, it may have one effect and on the other hand if the contents of FIR are in conformity with the evidence during the trial, it may have all together a different effect.
# Difference between FIR & Actual Evidence tendered in the Court:-
If there is a difference between FIR and the version narrated in the court, it is always a matter of grave suspicion to the court. If certain important facts are not mentioned in the FIR and they are brought to the court subsequently as substantial evidence, the court would be right in disbelieving that part of evidence.
There is no consequence on account of minor discrepancies between the statement mentioned in FIR and the statements appearing in the evidence of eye-witnesses.

If the facts stated in the FIR are based on hearsay, much importance can’t be attached to the discrepancies found therein. The statements mentioned in the FIR which are given in many cases under the circumstances of haste and without proper knowledge of true facts, ought not to be reviewed too narrowly.
# Defence and Cross-examination of FIR:-
Before conducting the cross-examination the original complaint and FIR has to be studied carefully. The following points of FIR must be examined thoroughly for the purpose of cross-examination:-i) The date and time of lodging the FIR to the police officer
ii) Name of the complainant
iii) Name of the police officer who recorded the complaint
iv) Date and time of dispatching the FIR from the police station to the Magistrate
v) Date and time of receiving the FIR by the Magistrate
vi) Time when the copy of FIR was given to the informant

During the cross-examination the defence may vary the nature and facts of the case according to the circumstances. The following points have to be examined carefully by the defence during cross-examination :-
1) Delay in lodging the complaint
2) Delay in recording the FIR
3) Delay in dispatching the FIR by the police officer to the Magistrate
4) Recording the FIR by an incompetent police officer
5) FIR whether signed by the informant
6) FIR recorded on the basis of telephone or telegram messages
7) The substance of an FIR whether entered in the General Diary
8) The original information given to the police officer whether suppressed or not
9) Whether the police officer recorded the FIR after commencement of investigation
10) Omission of the names of the accused persons and witnesses, place of occurrence etc.
11) Whether FIR was vague
12) Any serious discrepancy between FIR and the evidence produced by the witnesses in the court
13) Contradiction in the statement of the informant in the FIR and the statement made in the court
# Proving of FIR
a) FIR is a document and it has to be proved like any other document.
b) The informant must be produced in the court during the trial and must be examined by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defence.
c) FIR should be marked as an exhibit.
d) When the maker of the FIR is examined in the court, but such FIR is not tendered by the prosecution in accordance with the Indian Evidence Act, the court is debarred from relying on the FIR.
[Damodar Prasad Chandrika Prasad & others v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 622]

# FIR admitted in evidence by the consent of defence becomes part of prosecution evidence:-
It is a settled law that FIR is not a substantive evidence. It can be used only to contradict the maker or for corroborating his evidence and also to show that the implication of the accused was not an afterthought.
In the case of Malkiat Singh Vs State of Punjab [1991 SCC (Criminal)976], the examination of the first informant was dispensed with by the consent of the defence and the FIR became part of the prosecution evidence u/s 11 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Sec.6. The facts stated in such FIR that P.W.4 was not in speaking condition, would be used only as a relevant fact of prior existing state of facts in issue as res-gestae of the earliest information.
Conclusion:-
It may be submitted that from the view points of law of Evidence, FIR has a great significant role in each criminal litigation. FIR, being an information first in point of time, is a valuable piece of evidence in any criminal trial either for corroborating evidence or for contradicting witnesses. Therefore, it is necessary that FIR must be recorded in all circumstances especially where the person has arrived in the police station to lodge an FIR against a particular crime. If a FIR is duly recorded, it may provide a valuable evidence in a criminal case. Such information should be lodged with the police as soon as a person comes to know as to the commission of an offence. Apart from prevention of crimes and maintenance of law and order in the society, FIR may also lead to successful conclusion of a criminal trial.

The author can be reached at: debaditya_roy.1983@legalserviceindia.com

Promissory Note in India ( Save as .pdf )

Published : November 15, 2013 | Author : YSRAO JUDGE
Category : Civil Laws | Total Views : 825 | Rating :

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YSRAO JUDGE
Y.SRINIVASA RAO, M.A(English).,B.Ed.,LL.M.; Judicial Magistrate of I Class; Topper in LL.M

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A Brief Note On Promissory Note

The sum of money promised to be paid must be certain and definite amount. The law relating to ‘Negotiable Instruments’ in a Bills of Exchange Act, is codified in the commonwealth. Almost all jurisdictions, including in New Zealand, UK, Mauritius, codified the law as to negotiable Instruments. In India, The Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 came into force. To understand the meaning of negotiable instrument, it is suffice to say that it means a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer. During the Renaissance, Promissory note was in use in Europe. Later, during 20th century, the instrument changed substantially both in use and form and certain claused were added.
History of Promissory note:
Common prototypes of bills of exchanges and promissory notes originated in China. Here, in the 8th century during the reign of the Tang Dynasty they used special instruments called feitsyan for the safe transfer of money over long distances.[1] Later such document for money transfer used by Arab merchants, who had used the prototypes of bills of exchange – suftadja and hawala in 10–13th centuries, then such prototypes had used by Italian merchants in the 12th century. In Italy in 13–15th centuries bill of exchange and promissory note obtain their main features and further phases of its development have been associated with France (16–18th centuries, where the endorsement had appeared) and Germany (19th century, formalization of Exchange Law). In England (and later in the U.S.) Exchange Law was different from continental Europe because of different legal systems
Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:
"Promissory note".-
A "promissory note" is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.

To understand the term word ‘promissory note’ clearly, it is apt to refer the following ruling of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

Bolisetti Bhavannarayana @ ... vs Kommuru Vullakki Cloth Merchant ... ;1996 (1) ALD Cri 530, 1996 (1) ALT 917; Bench: K Agarwal, V R Reddy, N S Reddy; in this case , the following question came for consideration.
Whether the suit document is a Promissory Note? If not, what is its nature?
To answer this question, it was held as follows: ‘ As to the first question, we may remind ourselves of the fact that the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, (in short, the "Stamp Act"), levies stamp duty on various documents at varying rates and, therefore, it becomes necessary first to determine the nature of any document before deciding the question of proper stamp duty payable on such document. Accordingly the definition of a 'bond' or a 'promissory note' as given in the Stamp Act alone is material for the purpose of determination of the nature of any document. Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act defines 'promissory note' as follows:

"Promissory note" means a promissory note as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881;

"It also includes a note promissing the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happen."

In the context of this definition of "promissory note" given in Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act, the definition of the term as given in Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 assumes importance. Section 4 of the latter act defines "promissory note" as follows:

"A 'promissory note' is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.
Illustrations
A signs instruments in the following terms:(a) "I promise to pay B or order Rs. 500."

(b) "I acknowledge myself to be indebted to B in Rs. 1,000, to be paid on demand, for value received."

(c) "Mr. B, I.O.U. Rs. 1,000".

(d) "I promise to pay B Rs. 500, and all other sums which shall be due to him."

(e) "I promise to pay B Rs. 500, first deducting thereout any money which he may owe me."

(f) "I promise to pay B Rs. 500 seven days after my marriage with C."

(g) "I promise to pay B Rs. 500 on D's death, provided D leaves me enough to pay that sum."

(h) "I promise to pay B Rs. 500 and to deliver to him my black horse on 1st January next."

The instruments respectively marked (a) and (b) are promissory notes. The instruments respectively marked (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) are not promissory notes."

This definition of promissory note itself indicates that there may be several types of promissory notes. Out of these various categories of promissory notes, some may be treated as 'negotiable instrument' within the meaning of Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and some others may not be so treated, but by that very fact, the nature of the document will not change, if it is otherwise a promissory note. In other words, if a document is a 'promissory note' within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act, it will continue to be 'promissory note', whether it comes or does not come within the meaning of the term 'negotiable instrument' as defined in Section 13 of the Act. For this reason, were are of the view that Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, or the definition of the term 'negotiable instrument' is wholly irrelevant when it comes to deciding the nature of a particular document as a promissory note, or otherwise. Similarly and for similar reasons, it is wholly irrelevant to refer to the provisions of Section 13 of the Act while deciding the nature of any document as a 'bond' or otherwise. Accordingly anything to the contrary held in any of the authorities referred to in the orders of reference is not a good law.’
Promissory note is not a compulsorily attestable document:
Genearally no attestors are necessary to execute a promissory note. In Chandabolu Bhaskara Rao’s case, the Honble High Court of A.P held that ‘Since promissory note is not a compulsorily attestable document, even if the signatures of the attestors are taken, after its execution it does not amount the material alteration, and so it does not get vitiated. Therefore, whether there were attestors or not at the time of its execution is immaterial, more so when its execution is admitted.

The Hon’ble Full Bench Judgment of Madras High Court reported in Hariram v. I.T. Commissioner, (F.B.). In this case the following document was under consideration, which reads as follows:

"Promissory note executed on 14-6-1947 in favour of Arunachala Chettiar, son of Kolakkara Chettiar residing at Palappudi Village, hamlet of Sathyamangammal, Gingi Taluk by Kuppuswami Chettiar, son of Venkatachala Chettiar, residing at the aforesaid village. In respect of the sum received from you at Tiruvannamalai by me in the year 1943 and given for opening a Javuli shop by T. Arunachala Iyer the sum found due to you is Rs. 3,000. As this sum of rupees three thousand had to be paid to you, I shall pay the same together with interest at Rs. 0-4-0 per month per Rs. 100 in six equal instalments, and discharge the same. To this effect is the promissory note executed by me with my consent."

Their Lordships held that the document in question is not a promissory note, because there is no unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum of money.

The distinction between the promissory note and hundi or bill of exchange is explained by his lordship Vradachariar, J., in these words :

"But where the borrower gives his own promissory note as part of the loan transaction, it seems to me artificial to treat that every ' promise to pay ' obtained in that note as amounting to a payment, and then to seek to import the theory of ' conditional ' payment. "
If Promissory Note Is In-Admissible- Remedy:
1). "1. Whether a plaintiff can bring action for recovery of the amount advanced by him basing on the original consideration when the promissory note on foot of which action is brought is in-admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, and, if so, under what circumstances ?

2. If the promissory note is in-admissible in evidence, whether action can be maintained for recovery of the amount either on the theory of " money had and received " or under the provisions of Section 70 of the Contract Act. "

2). The question referred to the Hon’bel Bench of seven Judges by a Division Bench to which two of their lordships Obul Reddi and Madhava Reddy, JJ. were members, is

"Whether a plaintiff can lay action for recovery of the amount advanced by him basing on the original cause of action when the negotiable instrument evidencing the transaction is inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. "

The necessity to refer the question to a larger Bench arose as a result of the view expressed by Gopal Rao Ekbote, J. ( as he then was ) in Mohd. Jamal Saheb v. Munnar Begum, , which does not accord with the ruling of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Perumal Chettiar v. Kamakshi Ammal, ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ) ). The learned Judge, Gopal Rao Ekbote, held that the plaintiff can have his money back through the document is in-admissible in evidence because it is in-sufficiently stamped and that Section 91 of the Evidence Act is no bar to the plaintiff succeeding on a non-contractual basis, that is, in an action for money had and received. In so coming to the conclusion, the learned Judge seems to have felt that he is not bound by the decision of the Full Bench in ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ) as " two decisions decided in 1918 by the Privy Council ( John v. Dodwell and Co. Ltd. AIR 1918 PC 241 and Juscurn Boid v. Prithichandlal, AIR 1918 PC 151 ) were not brought to the notice of the Full Bench ". Having regard to the fact that the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and some other High Courts have taken a view different from that expressed by the Full Bench of five Judges of the Madras High Court in ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 ( 935 ) = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ) the question posed above was referred for consideration by a larger Bench.
Promissory Note Requires Proper Stamp Duty:
Venkatasubbaiah v. Bhushayya, 1963 (1) An.WR (NRC) 31. That was a case in which the Hon’ble High Court of A.P considered the fact of Section 35 of the Stamp Act. It held that the promissory executed in other State was liable for stamp duty in the State where it was produced, and for not paying necessary stamp duty, the document would be inadmissible. For such a contingency Section 19 of the Indian Stamp Act would apply. According to this Section, promissory note drawn or made out of India shall, before it is presented for acceptance or payment or endorses, transfers or otherwise negotiate in India, affix thereto the proper stamp and cancel the same. Prima facie the said section would not apply to the promissory note executed in India, and any promissory note executed in one State may be presented in any other State in India with the stamp bearing on the promissory note, no additional stamp duty need be paid. Section 19 contemplates that a promissory note drawn out of India and used in India or any State, it requires proper stamp duty as per Indian Law.
Recommendations For Amending Section 35 Of The Stamp Act, 1899
I deem that it is not out scope to see 178th Report of the Law Commission of India, as to recommendations for amending section 35 of the Stamp Act , 1899 & ‘bills of exchange on promissory notes’. The relevant portion of the report reads as follows:

Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 & ‘Bills of exchange on promissory notes’:

The opening part of sec. 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 provides as follows: ‘No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authorized to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless the instrument is duly stamped’.

Clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to the above sec. 35 contain provisions which permit the instrument to be used as evidence upon payment of the stamp duty in full (where it is unstamped) or upon payment of the deficient stamp duty (where there is deficiency in the stamp duty ) and the proviso permits the collection of penalty up to a maximum of ten times the stamp duty or the deficiency, as the case may be. Levy of penalty is of course discretionary

However, clause (a) of sec. 35 does not permit the validation of the instrument as stated above, in the case of ‘a bill of exchange or promissory note’. The result is that while in regard to all other instruments there is a procedure prescribed for subsequent validation of the instrument by collection of the stamp duty or penalty, such a procedure is not available in the case of “bills of exchange and promissory notes”. Even if the party who wants to use it as evidence is prepared to pay the stamp duty and penalty, he is not allowed to do so, so far as these instruments are concerned. The document become ‘waste paper’. On account of this rigid procedure applied only to “bills of exchange and promissory notes”, several debtors are allowed to escape liablility unjustly.

The Indian courts have also not been able to render justice in such cases where one party relies upon a “bill of exchange or promissory note” which is not stamped or is deficiently stamped. In addition, the provisions of sec. 91 of the Evidence Act also come in the way and preclude oral evidence being adduced in such cases. This is clear from illustration (b) below section 91 of the Evidence Act. These disabilities have led to a large volume litigation in courts. The Privy Council, the Supreme Court and the High Court have declared their helplessness in getting over these provisions of sec. 35 in so far as they disable validation of “bills of exchange and promissory notes”. The result is that these instruments are not allowed to be used as evidence ‘for any purpose’.

In one novel case in the Andhra Pradesh High Court during the time when our currency shifted from the old system of “rupees, annas and paise” to the present system of ‘naya-paise’, a promissory note which had to bear a stamp duty of 4 annas under the Stamp Act was executed on a document bearing stamp duty of ‘twenty four’ naya-paise on the undertaking that each anna was equal to six naya paise. But, under the new system, the correct equivalent of 4 annas was 25 paise, and the suit was dismissed on the ground of deficiency of stamp duty of one naya paisa. The law never changed. In fact, a special bench of seven Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in L. Sambasivarao vs. Balakotaiah AIR 1973 AP 343 (FB) affirmed an earlier judgment of five Judges of the Madras High Court in Perumal Chettiar vs. Kamakshi Ammal (AIR 1938 Mad 785 (FB)). The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is exhaustive and refers to the entire cased law on the subject. In fact it refers to 133 decisions of various courts. The question is whether this injustice which is the result of the Act of 1899 is to be remedied by enabling the deficiency to be paid, with or without penalty, as may be decided by the competent authority.

In some cases, courts invented various theories to grant relief, by holding that the ‘bill of exchange or promissory note’ was a collateral security or that it did not contain all the terms of the contract and therefore sec. 91 of the Evidence Act could not exclude oral evidence. In some other cases, Courts have stated that there could be an action on the debt. However, whenever such pleas of inadmissibility are raised, there is unending litigation and uncertainty. A party would not know if any such plea would ultimately be accepted for getting over the rigid posture of sec. 35 of the Stamp Act and the equally strict rule in sec. 91 of the Evidence Act.

In our view, justice to those who have parted with money under a bill of exchange or a promissory note, requires that this provision in sec. 35 be deleted and that the procedure for paying up the stamp duty or penalty, is made applicable to these instruments also. That will further augment the revenues of the State. Such a procedure will also eliminate unnecessary disputes as to whether the plaint can be amended by permitting the plaintiff to sue on the debt and also eliminate disputes as to admissibility of oral evidence.

The Commission, after due consideration of various aspects, namely, rendering justice to those who have parted with money, the benefit that will accrue to the State by way of collection of stamp duty or penalty, and elimination of unnecessary disputes, is of the considered view that in the proviso (a) of sec. 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, the words “any such instrument not being an instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding ten naya paise only, or a bill of exchange or promissory note, shall subject to all just exceptions be admitted in evidence”, the words “any such instrument shall be admitted in evidence”, shall be substituted It is also proposed to give limited retrospective operation to this amendment in all cases where proceedings before the courts or authorities referred to under sec. 35 have not reached.
Scope of The Presumption: Burden Of Proof In Promissory Note Cases:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1316], speaking through his lordship K. Subba Rao, J. considering the scope of the presumption had laid down the law thus:

"Section 118 lays down a special rule of evidence applicable to negotiable instruments. The presumption is one of law and thereunder a court shall presume, inter alia, that the negotiable or endorsed for Consideration. In effect it throws the burden of proof of failure of consideration on the maker of the note or the endorser, as the case may be. The phrase "burden of proof" has two meanings- One, the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case; the former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleading and so unchanged during the entire trial whereas the latter is not constant but shifted as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be directed evidence or admissions made by opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact. A plaintiff who says that he had sold certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note was executed as consideration for the goods and that he is in possession of the relevant account books to show that he was in possession of the goods sold and that the sale was reflected for a particular consideration should produce the said account books. If such a relevant evidence is withheld by the plaintiff, S.114, Evidence Act enables the Court to draw a presumption to the effect that, if produced, the said accounts would be unfavourable to the plaintiff. This presumption, if raised by a court, can under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law raised under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act."

‘ In Haribhavandas Parasaran and Co. v. A.D. Thakur A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 107, it was held that- It is mandatory that the presumption under Section 118(a) should be made until the contrary is proved. The fact that the nature of the consideration as recited in the negotiable instrument is different from that alleged in the plaint may have to be considered by the Court at a later stage, along with the entire evidence in this case, while determining whether the contrary to the statutory presumption has been proved. But, the mere existence of such a fact would not, by itself, be a justification for the Court to disregard Section 118 and frame an issue casting burden on the plaintiff to prove the consideration for a negotiable instrument, the execution of which has been admitted. The burden should still be on the defendant to prove want of consideration.’

In Kundanlal v. Custodian, Evacuee Property , it was observed ‘With particular reference to Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument's Act, the Supreme Court observed thus: As soon as the execution is proved, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act imposes a duty on the Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said instrument was made for consideration. This presumption shifts the burden of proof in the second sense, that is, the burden of establishing a case shifts to the defendant. The defendant may adduce direct evidence to prove that the promissory note was not supported by consideration, and if, he adduced acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff and so on. The defendant may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again to the plaintif’.

In Alex Mathew v. Philips a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had occasion to consider the same question and the Bench held-

The true principle where different cases have been pleaded and evidence has been let in, in support of both these sets of cases, is that the entire evidence in the case adduced by the plaintiff and the defendant and the findings entered by the Court or which are to be altered by the Court as well as the presumptions of law and fact which have to be drawn from all the facts established and attendant circumstances must be looked into as a whole to find out whether the presumption under Section 118(a) of the Act has been rebutted or not. It would not be correct merely on the basis of the finding negativing the case of the plaintiff regarding consideration to hold that the presumption under Section 118(a) has been rebutted.

In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Rajagopalan A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 773. a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Madras High Court held that where the recital of the consideration in the pro-note is admittedly false, the burden of proving consideration is shifted on to the holder of the promissory note as against the maker of the note himself and much stronger, therefore, would be the case when the consideration has to be proved against third parties.

In G. Venkata Reddi v. Nagi Reddi . Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., in dealing with a similar question with reference to the burden of proof when the recital in the negotiable instrument regarding consideration is not made out, (where the recital in the promissory note was that consideration was paid, but in the plaint it was pleaded that the consideration was lease amount, that was due from the defendant) held that the decision in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Rajagopalan A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 773. would prevail, as otherwise it will cause serious injustice.
To know more about the history of promissory note, the following rulings may be helpful to have a clear idea.
1. Mohd. Jamal Saheb v. Munnar Begum, , which does not accord with the ruling of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Perumal Chettiar v. Kamakshi Ammal, ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ) ).

2. The decision of the Full Bench in ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ) as " two decisions decided in 1918 by the Privy Council ( John v. Dodwell and Co. Ltd. AIR 1918 PC 241 and Juscurn Boid v. Prithichandlal, AIR 1918 PC 151 )

3. The Full Bench of five Judges of the Madras High Court in ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 ( 935 ) = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB )

4. Pithi Reddy v. Velayudasivan, ( 1885-1887 ) ILR 10 Mad 94 and Perumal Chettiar's case, ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ) )

5. The Full Bench in Perumal Chettiar's case. ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = AIR 1938 Mad 785 (FB)

6. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Perumal Chettiar's case. ILR (1938) Mad 933 = AIR 1938 Mad 785 ( FB ), is not correct and the decision requires to be overruled.

7. In Perumal Chettiar's case. ILR (1938) Mad 933 = AIR 1938 Mad 785 (FB) it was the third view that was expressed by the Full Bench.

8. Sheikh Khan, (1881) ILR 7 Cal 256,

9. Golap Chund Marwaree v. Thakurani Mohokoom Kooaree. (1878) ILR 3 Cal 314

10. Pramatha Natha Sandal v. Dwarka Nath Dey. (1896) ILR 23 Cal 851,

11. That opinion of Petheram. C.J., was based on what is stated in Farr v. Price, (1800) 1 East 55 = 102 ER 22 viz. That the existence of an unstamped promissory note does not debar the plaintiff from recovering on the original consideration if the pleadings are properly framed for that purpose.

12. In Indra Chandra v. Hiralal Rong. AIR 1936 Cal 127 and Mahatobuddin Mia v. Md, Nazir Joddar AIR 1936 Cal 170 R.C.Mitter. J., sitting single, held that it is not necessary that there should be an independent express contract prior to the execution of such a promissory note and that the fact that the money has been lent implies a promise to repay it and the plaintiff in such a case has a cause of action on the implied promise, which is independent of the promissory note.

13. Firm Tarachand v. Tamijuddin, AIR 1935 Cal 658 where he said that if the plaintiff's cause of action to recover the money had become complete before the execution of the promissory note, he would be entitled to sue and succeed on the original: but if he does not base his case in the plaint on the original consideration, he is out of Court because the promissory note is inadmissible in evidence being insufficiently stamped.

14. The Privy Council in Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishen Pershad, SIR 1918 PC 146 and followed the decision in Sheik Akbar v. Sheikh Khan, (1881) ILR 7 Cal 256 and Nazir Khan, v. Raz Mohan, AIR 1931 ALL 185 (FB). His view in the 1935 case was that if the execution of the promissory note and the borrowing of the money are contemporaneous constituting part and parcel of the same transaction and the note becomes inadmissible in evidence the plaintiff will be out of Court. The learned Judge with great respect to him seemed to swing between the two stands taken by the two Chief Justices of his Court.

15. Krishnaji Narayan Parkhi v. Rajamal Manikchand Marwari, (1900) ILR 24 Bom 360 was dealing with a case of liability arising out of a hundi.

16. Chenbasapa v. Lakshman Ramachandra, (1894) ILR 18 Bom 369. Where the distinction between cases in which the suit is brought solely on the note or hundi and cases in which there is and can be a claim to recover the original loan has been acknowledged.

17. Jacob 7 Co.v. Vicumsey. AIR 1927 Bom 437, followed the decision in (1900) ILR 24 Bom 360 on the ground that it is binding upon him, in holding that if the promissory note is insufficiently stamped the plaintiff can proceed with the suit on the loan.

18. As the latest opinion of the Allahabad High Court as expressed in AIR 1943 All 220 and is in conflict with the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Perumal Chettiar's case, ILR ( 1938 ) Mad 933 = ( AIR 1938 Mad 785 ) ( FB )

19. ( 1882 ) ILR 4 All 330, it was observed that :"Much though we might have wished to be able to hold that the bond entered into between the parties did not preclude the plaintiff-appellant from recovering on his account stated, we find ourselves unable to do so. "

20. Ram Sarup v. Jasodha Kunwar, ( 1912 ) ILR 34 All 158 which runs counter to the above view was rested on the dictum of Lord Kenyon in the well-known case of (1800) 1 East 55 = 102 ER

21. Banarasi Prasad v. Fazl Ahmad, (1906) ILR 28 All 298, though purported to follow the case of (1881) ILR 7 Cal 256

22. Baijnath Das v. Salig Ram, (1912) 16 Ind Cas 33 (All)

23. AIR 1929 All 254 and the view expressed by the learned Judges was quoted and endorsed by Sir Lionel Leach, C. J. in Perumal Cettiar's case, ILR (1938) Mad 933 = (AIR 1938 Mad 785) (FB) to the extent of the scope of Section 91 of the Evidence Act.

24. Baijanath Das's case (1912) 16 1nd Cas 33 (ALL)

25. AIR 1931 ALL 183 (FB) overruled the decisions in (1912) ILR 34 AII158 and (1906) ILR 28 AII 293 referred to supra and followed the decisions Parsotham Narain v. Taley Singh, (1903) ILR 26 AII 178 and Sheikh Akbar v. Sheikh Khan. (1882) ILR 7 Cal 256.

26. Miyan Bux v. Mt. Bodhiya, AIR 1928 AII 371 (SB).

27. A Full Bench of five Judges in AIR 1943 All 220 ( FB ).

28. A Full Bench of the Oudh High Court consisting of Wazir Hasan, C. J. Srivastava and Raza, JJ. However, took a different view from the one expressed in AIR 1931 All 183 ( FB )

29. The Full Bench case in AIR 1943 All220.

30. The Full Bench decision in AIR 1921 All 183 ( FB ) required reconsideration.

31. Maung Chit v. Roshan and Co., AIR 1934 Rang 339 = ILR 12 Rang 500 ( FB ). He, however, found himself unable to agree with the 4th and 6th propositions of Sir Arthur Page C. J. ( which were endorsed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court ) on the ground that he ( Page C. J. ) did not correctly state the law.

32. Ram Bahadur v. Dasuri Ram, ( 1913 ) 17 Cal LJ 399.

33. Mohd. Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh, 1936 All LJ 986 = AIR 1936 PC 171.

34. A division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in following the Full Bench decision in AIR 1943 All 220 ( FB)

35. The Full Bench decision, the question can scarcely be regarded as settled ; ( Dhaneshwar Sahu v. Ramrup Gir, ILR 7 Pat 845 = ( AIR 1928 Pat 426) where Macpherson, J., concerned only on the ground of stare decisis.

36. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sarajoo Prasad v. Rampawari Devi. considered the question whether every loan carried with it a contract to repay and if so, it was open to the plaintiff to bring a suit on the original consideration of the handnote.

37. Udaram Mangiram v. Laxman Marwari, AIR 1927 Nag 241 held that even though the promissory note becomes inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamp, the creditor can fall back on the original transaction under Section 70 of the Contract Act treating the promissory note as non-existent and ask for refund of the consideration paid. This decision supports the view of the learned Judge in , but runs counter to the Madras Full Bench view in Perumal Chettiar's case. ILR (1938) Mad 933 = AIR 1938 Mad 785 (FB).

38. Gulam Mohad. Labroo v. Habib Ullah. AIR 1966 J & K 127. After an elaborate review of the cases expressing divergent views, disagreed with the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1943 AII 220 (FB).

39. K. Anantharajaiah v. Shivaramaiah. AIR 1968 Mts 148

40. The Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in AIR 1934 Rang 389 = ILR 12 Rang 500 (FB) which was approved by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court.

41. When a loan is contracted it is an implied term of the agreement that the loan shall be repaid (1913) 41 1nd App 142 (PC)

42. When a promissory note or a bill of exchange or indeed anything else, is given by the narrower to the lender in connection with the loan, either at the time when the loan is contracted or afterwards, the terms upon which it is given and taken is a question of fact and not of law, (1889) 22 QBD 610.

43. Re Romer and Haslam, (1893) 2 QB 286 at p. 296 and Bowen. L.J. (Ibid. P. 300):Farr v. Price (1800) 1 East 55 = (102 ER 22)

44. Commr. Of Income-tax, Bombay v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., ( 1885-1887 ) ILR 10 Mad 94 and also the two of the cases in Gopala Padayachi v. Rajagopal Naidu, AIR 1926 Mad 1148 and Chinnayya Naidu v. Srinivasa Naidu, AIR 1935 Mad 206 = ( 67 ad LJ 912 ) which struck a different note were referred to in main judgment of Sir Lionel Leach, C. J., and in the judgment of Justice Varadachariar, Krishnasami v. Rangaswami, ( 1884 ) ILR 7 Mad 112

45. Pothireddy's case, ( 1885-1887 ) ILR 10 Mad 94,

46. Muthusastrigal v. Viswanatha, ILR 38 Mad 660 at p. 663 = ( AIR 1914 Mad 657 (2) ).

47. Dula Meah v. Abdul Rahaman, 28 Cal WN 70 = 81 Ind Cas 461 = ( AIR 1924 Cal 452 ),

48. The case of Brown v. Watts, ( 1808 ) 127 ER 870,

49. Re Romer & Haslam, ( 1893 ) 2 QB 286

50. Crowe v. Clay, ( 1854 ) V. 9 Exch

51. Payana Reena Saminathan v. Pana Lena Palaniappa, (1913 ) 41 Ind App 142 ( PC )

52. Dargavarabu Sarrapu v. Rampratabu ( 1902 ) ILR 25 Mad 580 ( FB )

53. Jambhu Chetty v. Palaniappa Chettiar ( 1903 ) ILR 26 Mad 526,

54. Palaniappa Chetty v. Arunachellam Chetty, ( 1911 ) 21 Mad LJ 432

55. Felix Hadley & Co. v. Hadley ( 1898 ) 2 Ch 680 and Lord Maugham in Rhokana Corpn. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commrs. 1938 AC 380 observed at p. 433 :

56. Chitty on Contracts ( Twenty-third Edition )

57. The book on Bills of Exchange ( Twenty-second Edition ) at page 392 :

58. Taylor on Evidence Vol. 1 P. 276 ( 12th Edition

59. The Madras High Court in AIR 1926 Mad 1148 and AIR 1935 Mad 206, which conflict with Pothi Reddy's case, ( 1885-1887 ) ILR 10 Mad 94, for those two decisions were referred to and overruled by the Full Bench.

60. Pothi Reddy's case ( 1885-1887 ) ILR 10 Mad 94, and Sheik Akbar v. Sheikh Khan, ( 1881 ) ILR 7 Cal 256

61. Chanda Singh v. Amritsar Banking Co., AIR 1922 Lah 307

62. Ram Jas v. Shahabuddin, AIR 1927 Lah 89.

63. Sohan Lal Nihal Chand v. Raghu Nath Singh, AIR 1934 Lah 606

64. Amin Chand v. Firm Madho Rao Banwari Lal, .

65. The two decisions of the Privy Council in AIR 1918 PC 241 and AIR 1918 PC 151

66. Sadasuk Janki Das's case, AIR 1918 PC 146

67. Three decisions of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. B. K. Mondal and Sons, ; New Marine Coal Co. v. Union of India,and Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

68. The case of a Royal Bank of Canada v. The King, 1913 AC 283, was an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alberta. The main controversy was as to the validity of the statute ( Alberta Act 1 Geo 5 C 9 ) passed in 1910, dealing with the sale of certain bonds.

69. Wilson v. Church, ( 1879 ) 13 Ch D 1 at p. 49,

70. Moses v. Macferlan, ( 1760 ) 97 ER 676

71. Sinclair v. Brougham, 1914 AC

72. see Smith's Leading Cases, Notes to Marriot v. Hampton, ( 1797 ) 7 TR 269 = 2 Sm LC ( 11th Ed. ) 421)

73. Brook's Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd. V. Goodman Brothers, )1937 1 KB 534,

74. 1914 AC 398 by P.H. Wins-field in (1937) 53 LQR 447.

75. The case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbarin Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd., 1943 AC 32 ;

76. Lothamasu Sambasiva Rao vs Thadwarthi Balakotiah: AIR 1973 AP 342
Conclusion:
This article does not give information as to all the aspects of promissory note, for instance, I did not touch on the aspect of material alterations of the promissory note, the plea of forgery, fabrication, ect.,. Inasmuch as there are catena of rulings on the ‘promissory note’, it is very difficult to discuss all the case-law. However, I attempted to put forth some rulings on this aspect. A close scrutiny and understanding the dicta observed in the above rulings, I am in no doubt to say our knowledge on the aspect of Promissory note will be enriched. There are certain amendments are needed as to section 35 of the stamp act, 1899 & ‘bills of exchange on promissory notes. It is not out scope to remember the words of Lord Atkin "Being primarily a receipt, even if coupled with the promise to pay, it was not a promissory note. As the document did not record or purport to record all the terms of the contract between the parties and as there was nothing in the document explaining how the money came to be received the parties were not prevented from showing that it was paid by way of loan or deposit or for some other purpose. ".
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# Chandabolu Bhaskara Rao vs Betha Saidi Reddy; decided on 5 April, 2006
# Lothamasu Sambasiva Rao vs Thadwarthi Balakotiah ; AIR 1973 AP 342
# Law Commission of India; One hundred and seventy eighth report On recommendations for amending various enactments, Both civil and criminal.; December,2001
# Observed in K.P.O. Moideenkutty Hajee vs Pappu Manjooran & Anr ; JT 1996 (3), 329 1996 SCALE (2)784; Bench: Justice Ramaswamy, K.
# In Kundanlal v. Custodian, Evacuee Property (1963) 1 S.C.J. 347 : (1963) 1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 85 : (1963) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 85 : A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1316.